While some might argue that twelve days is too brief a window to evaluate Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion, dismissing the early data would be a mistake. In reality, the opening stages of these operations have already provided a wealth of critical observations and actionable lessons.

The Assumptions

The primary lesson of warfare is the danger of assumption. Historical precedents like Operation Sindoor and the more recent Operation Epic Fury illustrate how flawed projections can derail strategic objectives.

In Operation Sindoor, the Indian command incorrectly assumed Pakistani forces would refrain from targeting military assets; instead, Pakistan responded with an aggressive offensive against both defense installations and civilian populations.

Similarly, Operation Epic Fury was predicated on the belief that the Iranian leadership would collapse under the weight of “unimaginable destruction.” This assumption proved equally catastrophic. Rather than buckling, Iran demonstrated remarkable resilience by:

• Ensuring Continuity: Appointing a new Supreme Leader almost immediately.

• Vowing Retaliation: Maintaining a defiant stance and pledging to avenge the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Both cases serve as a sobering reminder that an enemy’s resolve and capacity for escalation are rarely dictated by the aggressor’s expectations.

Lack of Clarity

The second lesson from the current conflict in Iran is the necessity of operational clarity. While Operation Sindoor benefitted from a well-defined objective and a synchronized execution plan, Operation Epic Fury—despite its explicit goal of regime change—suffers from a strategic vacuum regarding the actual path to that outcome.

Like most modern conflicts, this war commenced with massive missile salvos. This opening gambit provides a high-speed, low-risk mechanism to achieve three immediate effects:

1. Blinding the enemy’s surveillance assets.

2. Disorganizing command structures.

3. Shocking the political leadership before a coherent defense can be mounted.

Early waves aim at leadership bunkers, command and control (C2) nodes, communication hubs, and headquarters to disrupt decision‑making and delay a coordinated response. These attacks are used for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) and to disable runways, hit parked aircraft, and damage radar, opening the airspace for follow‑on air operations. In the present war, the most certain aim was to create a psychological shock in leadership and society, signalling escalation dominance, and testing political will.

Retaliation from Iran was widely anticipated, and their entry into the conflict showcased the scale of their specialized arsenal. Estimates suggest Iran maintains a robust stockpile of roughly 2,500 to 2,700 ballistic missiles, including the Shahab series, Fateh variants, Qiam, and Zolfaghar, alongside more advanced systems like the Sejjil and Khorramshahr.

The breakdown of their offensive capabilities includes:

• Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs): 500–700 units capable of reaching Israel.

• Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs): 1,800–2,000 units for regional engagement.

• UAVs and Loitering Munitions: Approximately 80,000 units, featuring the Shahed (129, 131, 136, 238) and Mohajer-6 platforms.

What is known from the open source is that the MRBMs have been reduced by 70%, leaving around 180 operational amid rapid destruction and launches. SRBMs are down 50%, with 950 remaining. Loitering munitions are down by 15% and the present stockpile could be around 68,000. The losses accumulated faster due to strikes on storage and logistics facilities. Launchers, critical for firing, started at around 450 but are now at around 90-120 after 75%-80% losses.

But what about the US and Israel? The United States is primarily using Tomahawk cruise missiles, precision-guided bombs from bombers, HIMARS rockets, Hellfire missiles from drones, and low-cost one-way attack drones. Following the expenditure of about 400 Tomahawks in the first days of Operation Epic Fury against Iran, representing around 10% of the pre-war stockpile, the present US stockpile could be around 3,600–3,750 missiles. It is also noteworthy that the annual output of Tomahawk remains low at 90–100 missiles.

Israel has not publicly confirmed using any MRBMs or SRBMs against Iran in Operation Roaring Lion. Strikes rely on air-launched munitions like bunker-busters, precision-guided bombs, and air-to-ground missiles from F-35I, F-16I, and F-15I jets. Israel possesses Jericho III (MRBM/IRBM, range 4,800–6,500 km) and possibly Jericho II (MRBM, 1,500–3,500 km), but these are nuclear-capable strategic systems not disclosed in conventional strikes on Iran.

While it appears the U.S. and Israel maintain a significant ordnance advantage over an increasingly depleted Iran, military strikes have so far fallen short of their objectives. Consequently, the central uncertainty remains: how exactly does the U.S.-Israel alliance plan to translate this aerial superiority into actual regime change?

Air Defence Systems

The next lesson to learn is in the air defence domain. Iran deployed its layered integrated air defence system (IADS) during the 2026 US-Israel strikes, including S-300PMU-2, Bavar-373, and Khordad-15 systems. While the performance of Russian and indigenous systems was poor, the epic failure was the HQ-9B, acquired from China in mid-2025, via oil-for-weapons deals. HQ-9B failed to intercept US/Israeli Tomahawks, stealth bombers, and drones, allowing deep penetrations. Iran’s IADS downed ~15-20% of incoming threats initially, dropping to under 5% by day 3 as US/Israeli SEAD missions destroyed 75-80% of launchers and radars.

The US Patriot PAC-3 batteries protected forward bases in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, intercepting ~85% of incoming Iranian ballistic missiles and drones in the first week, though stocks are depleting rapidly. But the major embarrassment the US faced was when Iranian missile attacks caused massive damage to the $1.1 billion US AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The radar is dubbed as the “nerve center” of US missile defence in the Gulf, which coordinates Patriots, THAADs, and regional interceptors with a 5,000 km tracking range. Iranian strikes also destroyed four US THAAD-linked AN/TPY-2 radars at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Jordan), Al Ruwais and Al Sader (the UAE), and Prince Sultan Base (Saudi Arabia). These losses leave THAAD batteries “inert” without radars, forcing the US to rely on Patriots and naval Aegis amid depleting stocks.

Israeli IADS consists of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2/3 systems, and Iron Beam. Israel intercepted ~92% of 1,500+ Iranian drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, with Arrow downing Kheibar MRBMs and Iron Dome countering Shahed swarms. No major penetrations reported over Israel proper, unlike Gulf bases; layered redundancy and fighter jet intercepts bolstered effectiveness despite Iranian saturation attempts. Though after the initial success, Israeli interception rates fell to 70-80%. Israeli systems were found to be ineffective against the Iranian hypersonic missiles.

Lessons For India

Giving a well-defined goal is just a small part of a bigger puzzle. If means to achieve the aims and the simulation of various scenarios have not been explored before jumping into the war, then that mission is bound to succeed only on paper. Such simulations and war gaming are effectively used to eliminate the chances of assumptions. Point to note here is that the US has no idea how to take the war to the next level in just eleven days.

Just having a well-rounded inventory of indigenous missiles, weapons, and equipment is also not enough. There should be a well-guarded and well-oiled ecosystem to start the production as soon as the balloon goes up. It is noteworthy here that while Iran had many indigenous systems, the factories producing them were not well guarded. The destruction of those factories has affected the Iranian war efforts resulting in demoralisation of the forces and the leadership.

While the Israeli air defence systems’ performance was fair, they still failed to prove their efficacy against hypersonic missiles. The American and the Iranian systems were found lacking in many aspects. The US fixed AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar was not ready for saturation attacks by drones. Though the THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis systems were guarding it, the fact that it was damaged/destroyed by a drone speaks of their ineffectiveness against such incoming projectiles.

Speaking of the Iranian air defence systems, it had two key issues. Firstly, the technology of the systems was not up-to-date or up to the mark. And secondly, the systems were not networked. This huge lacuna in the system left the leadership without a complete picture of a modern-day battlefield, leading to heavy losses.

It is amply clear that the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) S-400 air defence systems were targeted unsuccessfully during Operation Sindoor. Some of the proactive measures IAF has taken to guard the S-400s since then are:

• Inflatable Decoys: The IAF is set to procure 400 inflatable decoys that replicate the appearance of actual S-400 Triumf components, such as launchers and radar units. These are intended to confuse enemy satellites and surveillance drones.
• Specialized Camouflage: The IAF is implementing a project involving advanced radar-absorbent coatings (RAM) and metamaterial screens (MM) designed to make the S-400 systems harder to detect by synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and other sensory technologies.
• Operational Survivability: The S-400 systems are being paired with the Russian Pantsir short-range air defence system to provide a two-layered, “shoot-and-scoot” capability, allowing them to engage threats and move quickly to avoid counterstrikes.
• Development & Deployment: The new, improved shielding tech is expected to arrive by mid-2027, with plans to fully equip all S-400 batteries with these enhancements by 2030.
• At the doctrinal and system level, India’s air defences, using the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), Akashteer system, and Joint Air Defence Centres (JADC) are well on their way to a networked, integrated command‑and‑control future. However, the networking is not yet universally uniform across all units and locations.

Modern warfare is an ever-evolving vista where the “butterfly effect” can turn an innocuous event into a strategic storm. While success today demands the rapid absorption of technology and unmatched speed of execution, age-old wisdom—tactical proficiency, strategic depth, and the fundamental principles of war—remains as relevant as ever. The true challenge lies in the seamless fusion of the old with the new. In this high-stakes balancing act, many leaders falter: some remain anchored to the past, while others become overawed by the novelty of the future.