Some may argue that Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion are barely into the twelfth day, and it would be too early to start taking lessons. That would be incorrect to deduce. In fact, there is plenty to observe and learn within these twelve days.

The Assumptions

The first lesson is never to assume anything in a war. There are indications that, just as with ‘Operation Sindoor,’ Operation Epic Fury has many assumptions regarding the enemy’s reaction to the war. While the Operation Sindoor assumed that the Pakistani forces would not target Indian military assets, Operation Epic Fury assumed that the Iranian leadership would buckle under the stress of unimaginable destruction. Both assumptions were proved wrong. Pakistan not only attacked the Indian defence but also targeted civilians. Similarly, Iran not only vowed to avenge the death of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, without backing down, but also selected a new Supreme Leader within no time.

Lack of Clarity

The second lesson to learn from the present Iran war is the clarity on how to achieve the end result. While the Operation Sindoor had a well-defined aim and execution, the Operation Epic Fury despite having clear cut aim of regime change lacks clarity on how to achieve that aim. Now this war started just like all the modern wars, with missile salvos. Such a start offers a fast, low‑risk way to blind, disorganize, and politically shock the opponent before they can fully respond.

Early waves aim at leadership bunkers, command and control (C2) nodes, communication hubs, and headquarters to disrupt decision‑making and delay a coordinated response. These attacks are used for Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD) and to disable runways, hit parked aircraft, and damage radar, opening the airspace for follow‑on air operations. In the present war, the most certain aim was to create a psychological shock in leadership and society, signalling escalation dominance, and testing political will.

It was obvious that Iran would retaliate, and they did. Iran entered the latest war with roughly 500-700 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, capable of reaching Israel), 1,800-2,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and 80,000 loiter munitions. Total ballistic missile stockpile estimates ranged from 2,500-2,700, including older types like Shahab series, Fateh variants, Qiam, Zolfaghar, and newer ones like Sejjil or Khorramshahr. Drones included Shahed 129/131/136/238 and Mohajer-6.

What is known from the open source is that the MRBMs have been reduced by 70%, leaving around 180 operational amid rapid destruction and launches. SRBMs are down 50%, with 950 remaining. Loitering munitions are down by 15% and the present stockpile could be around 68,000. The losses accumulated faster due to strikes on storage and logistics facilities. Launchers, critical for firing, started at around 450 but are now at around 90-120 after 75%-80% losses.

But what about the US and Israel? The United States is primarily using Tomahawk cruise missiles, precision-guided bombs from bombers, HIMARS rockets, Hellfire missiles from drones, and low-cost one-way attack drones. Following the expenditure of about 400 Tomahawks in the first days of Operation Epic Fury against Iran, representing around 10% of the pre-war stockpile, the present US stockpile could be around 3,600–3,750 missiles. It is also noteworthy that the annual output of Tomahawk remains low at 90–100 missiles.

Israel has not publicly confirmed using any MRBMs or SRBMs against Iran in Operation Roaring Lion. Strikes rely on air-launched munitions like bunker-busters, precision-guided bombs, and air-to-ground missiles from F-35I, F-16I, and F-15I jets. Israel possesses Jericho III (MRBM/IRBM, range 4,800–6,500 km) and possibly Jericho II (MRBM, 1,500–3,500 km), but these are nuclear-capable strategic systems not disclosed in conventional strikes on Iran.

So, from the foregoing, it is clear that the US and Israel don’t have the shortages of missiles while Iran has spent a considerable amount of its stock of missiles in attacking various nations. Nevertheless, the strikes against Iran have not achieved the desired results and the question still lingers as to how the US-Israel partnership would achieve regime change in Iran.

Air Defence Systems

The next lesson to learn is in the air defence domain. Iran deployed its layered integrated air defence system (IADS) during the 2026 US-Israel strikes, including S-300PMU-2, Bavar-373, and Khordad-15 systems. While the performance of Russian and indigenous systems was poor, the epic failure was the HQ-9B, acquired from China in mid-2025, via oil-for-weapons deals. HQ-9B failed to intercept US/Israeli Tomahawks, stealth bombers, and drones, allowing deep penetrations. Iran’s IADS downed ~15-20% of incoming threats initially, dropping to under 5% by day 3 as US/Israeli SEAD missions destroyed 75-80% of launchers and radars.

The US Patriot PAC-3 batteries protected forward bases in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, intercepting ~85% of incoming Iranian ballistic missiles and drones in the first week, though stocks are depleting rapidly. But the major embarrassment the US faced was when Iranian missile attacks caused massive damage to the $1.1 billion US AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The radar is dubbed as the “nerve center” of US missile defence in the Gulf, which coordinates Patriots, THAADs, and regional interceptors with a 5,000 km tracking range. Iranian strikes also destroyed four US THAAD-linked AN/TPY-2 radars at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Jordan), Al Ruwais and Al Sader (the UAE), and Prince Sultan Base (Saudi Arabia). These losses leave THAAD batteries “inert” without radars, forcing the US to rely on Patriots and naval Aegis amid depleting stocks.

Israeli IADS consists of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2/3 systems, and Iron Beam. Israel intercepted ~92% of 1,500+ Iranian drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, with Arrow downing Kheibar MRBMs and Iron Dome countering Shahed swarms. No major penetrations reported over Israel proper, unlike Gulf bases; layered redundancy and fighter jet intercepts bolstered effectiveness despite Iranian saturation attempts. Though after the initial success, Israeli interception rates fell to 70-80%. Israeli systems were found to be ineffective against the Iranian hypersonic missiles.

Lessons For India

Giving a well-defined goal is just a small part of a bigger puzzle. If means to achieve the aims and the simulation of various scenarios have not been explored before jumping into the war, then that mission is bound to succeed only on paper. Such simulations and war gaming are effectively used to eliminate the chances of assumptions. Point to note here is that the US has no idea how to take the war to the next level in just eleven days.

Just having a well-rounded inventory of indigenous missiles, weapons, and equipment is also not enough. There should be a well-guarded and well-oiled ecosystem to start the production as soon as the balloon goes up. It is noteworthy here that while Iran had many indigenous systems, the factories producing them were not well guarded. The destruction of those factories has affected the Iranian war efforts resulting in demoralizing the forces and the leadership.

While the Israeli air defence systems’ performance was fair, they still failed to prove their efficacy against hypersonic missiles. The American and the Iranian systems were found lacking in many aspects. The US fixed AN/FPS-132 Block 5 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radar was not ready for saturation attacks by drones. Though the THAAD, Patriot, and Aegis systems were guarding it, the fact that it was damaged/destroyed by a drone speaks of their ineffectiveness against such incoming projectiles.

Speaking of the Iranian air defence systems, it had two key issues. Firstly, the technology of the systems was not up-to-date or up to the mark. And secondly, the systems were not networked. This huge lacuna in the system left the leadership without a complete picture of a modern-day battlefield, leading to disastrous destruction.

It is amply clear that the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) S-400 air defence systems were targeted unsuccessfully during Operation Sindoor. Some of the proactive measures IAF has taken to guard the S-400s since are:

• Inflatable Decoys: The IAF is set to procure 400 inflatable decoys that replicate the appearance of actual S-400 Triumf components, such as launchers and radar units. These are intended to confuse enemy satellites and surveillance drones.
• Specialized Camouflage: The IAF is implementing a project involving advanced radar-absorbent coatings (RAM) and metamaterial screens (MM) designed to make the S-400 systems harder to detect by synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) and other sensory technologies.
• Operational Survivability: The S-400 systems are being paired with the Russian Pantsir short-range air defence system to provide a two-layered, “shoot-and-scoot” capability, allowing them to engage threats and move quickly to avoid counterstrikes.
• Development & Deployment: The new, improved shielding tech is expected to arrive by mid-2027, with plans to fully equip all S-400 batteries with these enhancements by 2030.
• At the doctrinal and system level, India’s air defences, using the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), Akashteer system, and Joint Air Defence Centres (JADC) are well on their way to a networked, integrated command‑and‑control future. However, the networking is not yet universally uniform across all units and locations.

In the end the modern warfare is an ever-evolving vista where an innocuous happening may become a storm using the butterfly effect. While modern warfare depends upon the quick absorption of technology and speed of execution, age-old war wisdom, tactical knowledge, strategic thinking, and principles of war remain relevant even in the modern era. The only challenge that remains is the fusion of the old with the new.