The decline of the IAF’s combat power is the ‘elephant in the room’ that India’s defense establishment refuses to acknowledge. What was once the primary guarantor of regional security is staring at a hollowed-out future. While it is easy to scapegoat the bureaucracy, the responsibility for this stagnation is shared equally by HAL and the military leadership itself.

For too long, honest strategic assessments have been sacrificed for political and institutional comfort. We exist in a geography where our primary adversary, China, is rapidly achieving technological parity with the West. To ignore the PLAAF’s trajectory is to invite a strategic catastrophe. This analysis may offend established sensibilities; however, it is a necessary, unvarnished look at the IAF-PLAAF balance of power through 2035.

The IAF

Currently, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has 29 operational fighter squadrons, including Su-30MKI (12+1 squadrons), MiG-29UPG (3), SEPECAT Jaguar (6), Mirage-2000 (3), LCA Tejas Mk1 (2), and Rafale (2). Starting in 2030, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage-2000 squadrons will begin retiring, with complete retirement by 2035.

To extend the Jaguar fleet’s lifespan until 2035, India recently purchased 20 used Jaguars from the Omani Air Force for spare parts. Previously, the IAF purchased 31 airframes along with engines and assorted spares from France, and two Jaguar T-2 trainers and more than 600 spare items from the UK. On January 6, 2026, the Indian Air Force initiated contacts with Ecuador to evaluate the acquisition of stored Jaguar airframes for the recovery of engines, structural assemblies, and systems. Ecuador had withdrawn the Jaguar from frontline service in 2002 and placed them in warm storage, a preservation state intended to maintain airframe integrity. Despite this, around 11 squadrons, or approximately 250-260 aircraft, will phase out gradually until 2035. This means the IAF will be left with only 18 squadrons by that year, if no new platforms are added.

However, the IAF has ordered 180 Tejas Mk1A fighters (83 + 97) and plans to order 120-130 Tejas Mk2 fighters (six squadrons, with the possibility of increasing orders up to 200 platforms). Now, some numbers — Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) can produce only 24 airframes annually. So, building 180 planes would take about 7.5 years if there are no delays. The biggest obstacle is General Electric (GE), the supplier of the F404-GE-IN20 turbofan engines.

The Tejas Mk1 was conceived in 1983 and finally built around the GE F404 engine in 1986. The first flight was in January 2001, but the HAL waited until March 2021 to initiate a contract for 99 F404-GE-IN20 engines, each producing 85 kN. A contract for an additional 113 engines was signed in November 2025. The first engine was scheduled for delivery by March 2023 but was only delivered in March 2025. Since then, GE has provided just five engines over nine months. GE has promised to supply 20 engines in the FY2026-27, but such promises should be taken with a pinch of salt. Even if GE delivers the promised magic number of two engines per month, full delivery wouldn’t occur before 2032, meaning the Tejas Mk1A project would not be completed until then.

The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) selected the GE F414-INS6 engine, generating 98 kN for Tejas Mk2, in 2010. The hope that the Kaveri engine would power the Tejas platform never materialized. So, ongoing negotiations for this engine are expected to conclude by the first quarter of 2026. The same engine will power India’s 5th-generation Advanced Medium Fighter Aircraft (AMCA) Mk1 (two squadrons). The AMCA Mk2, which will comprise five squadrons, will be powered by a 120-140 kN engine developed through a joint venture between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Safran of France.

If HAL is likely to complete the Tejas Mk1A project by 2032, how will the Tejas Mk2 project commence without increasing capacity? Since the Indian government is involving private companies in the AMCA project, the induction of AMCA Mk1 could have a similar timeline to Tejas Mk2 — around 2035 or later. The engine for the AMCA Mk2 will take approximately 12 years to develop, pushing its induction to 2037 or beyond. Therefore, the timeline for the AMCA’s entry into service could extend to 2040.

The news of the 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft deal being concluded soon is gathering momentum. The Rafale has emerged as a favorite choice, and the Defence Procurement Board, headed by the Defence Secretary, has already cleared the project. The proposal would now be sent across to the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), followed by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). If all things are in place, then the selection announcement could be made during French President Emmanuel Macron’s 19-20 February visit to India.

Even after making the announcement, the actual contract may take another year or so. As of the end of 2025, the Rafale order book stands at 220 jets. Dassault Aviation’s current production capacity for Rafale jets stands at 26 aircraft per year. The company aims to increase output to 36 jets annually by late 2026 and further to 48-60 per year from 2027 onward. If for calculation purposes, the average production rate is taken to be 48 aircraft per year, even then deliveries of 220 aircraft would take close to five years. Since India wants to buy 18 jets in fly-away condition, looking at the production timeline the IAF will get the 1st fighter from France only by 2032. However, if France sacrifices the French air force’s deliveries of 45 jets, then maybe the IAF will start getting deliveries by 2031 and not 2030, as perceived.

The PLAAF

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force is expected to field about 1,000 J-20 fifth-generation air superiority fighters by 2030, according to a recent report from the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This estimate highlights a significant increase in production to about 120 fighters annually in 2025. This came after prominent fighter program analyst Abraham Abrams, in his book China’s Stealth Fighter: The J-20 ‘Mighty Dragon’ and the Growing Challenge to Western Air Dominance, projected a production run of more than 1000 fighters in 2024.

Alongside the American F-35 and the fourth-generation J-16, the J-20’s production scale is currently unmatched. In a record-breaking year for the F-35 Lightning II program, Lockheed Martin also delivered 191 F-35s in 2025, surpassing the previous delivery record of 142 jets. However, unlike the F-35, which is being built to equip over a dozen services worldwide, all J-20s are being built only for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

According to a RUSI assessment “sophistication and realism of PLAAF and PLANAF (Naval Air Force) regular training has risen, especially in the J-16 and J-20 fleets,”. In collaboration with PLAN surface action units and one another, aircrew regularly conduct intricate training and simulated combat flights including fighters, bombers, tankers, and AEW&C aircraft. It reported that this is particularly notable in the Sea of Japan and surrounding Taiwan.

The significant training advancements are supporting the rise in the quantity and proficiency of advanced fifth and “4+ generation” fighters. The evaluation also specifically highlighted the advancements in air-to-air missile technology, which have occasionally provided Chinese fighter units with a notable edge over their American Air Force counterparts.

The most recent evaluations of the J-20’s production run closely align with the fifteenth anniversary of its first flight in January 2011. The fighter’s service entry six years later was a precursor to the fact that its development would go much more smoothly than that of its competitors in the US and Russia. It also comes right after video footage was released confirming that the first batch of J-20s with twin WS-15 next-generation turbofan engines had finished serial production in late December 2025. This is a significant milestone that will increase the fighter’s advantages over competing Western fighter types in terms of flight performance, range, and power for onboard systems. It also coincides with what seems to be one of the most dangerous operations in the program’s history: a fighter appeared to fly over Taiwan Island while avoiding interception by the Taiwanese Air Force, which is officially on high alert, defending itself from the PLA.

The J-20 fleet’s rapid growth has a major impact on India’s power dynamics. It has made it increasingly difficult for a Western-dominated balance of power to take hold. With less than half the range, a much smaller missile-carrying capacity and radar, and more conservative flight performance, the F-35, the only similarly advanced fighter, has been prioritized for deployments in the region by the United States and an increasing number of Western Bloc states, from Italy to the Netherlands.

If that were not enough, in 2024 China began prototype flight testing of its sixth-generation fighters several years ahead of the United States. China could soon be leading the world in deploying the first sixth-generation fighters, which are expected to improve the balance of power in the air in the early 2030s. Production of the fifth-generation fighter type may be drastically reduced or discontinued when a sixth-generation replacement for the J-20 is introduced.

In the End

By 2035, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is projected to field a fleet of over 1,500 J-20 stealth fighters. Combined with the induction of the J-35A and modernized J-10s and J-16s, China’s total fighter strength could exceed 2,200 modern platforms. The most destabilizing shift, however, will occur in the mid-2030s as sixth-generation platforms—designated as the J-36, J-50, or J-XX—begin entering active service.

While China leaps into the sixth generation, India remains tethered to 4.5 or “5-minus” generation deliveries. The AMCA Mk2 (India’s 5.5-generation hope) is likely to remain stalled by 2035 due to delays in the GTRE-Safran joint venture engine.

The regional balance is further complicated by the potential deployment of J-35As and PL-17 long-range missiles to Pakistan as early as 2028. In modern network-centric warfare, this creates a “detection-to-kill” disparity that India’s current AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) inventory cannot adequately bridge.

Consider the physics of the engagement:

• The Rafale Challenge: A Rafale’s AESA radar may only detect a stealthy J-20 or J-35A (RCS of 0.01 – 0.1 m²) at ranges of 40–80 km.

• The Chinese Advantage: Conversely, Chinese sensors could track a Rafale (RCS of (0.1 – 1 m²) at 150 km or more.

• The Stealth Factor: This disparity worsens significantly against newer Chinese platforms targeting a “true stealth” (RCS of 0.001 m²)

For a long time, I have been an outright critic of Chinese equipment quality, operational philosophy, and training; however, their strategic foresight demands acknowledgment. Two specific initiatives illustrate their “long game”:

• Talent Acquisition: During the collapse of the Soviet Union, China aggressively recruited unemployed aerospace engineers. This decades-long investment has culminated in a self-reliant ecosystem of fighter engines across multiple classes.
• Tactical Evolution: Recognizing deficiencies in pilot training, China bypassed traditional learning curves by hiring retired Western fighter pilots to train PLAAF aircrews.

While China demonstrated proactive, unconventional problem-solving, India’s defense bureaucracy appears trapped in a cycle of “crisis-management” and knee-jerk reactions. It is time one asks the relevant questions to the policy makers: Is the IAF being prepared for an equal contest, or are we just surviving from one crisis to another?